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Abstract: Today, non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”) are widely recognized as 
a global public health crisis and a foreign policy priority.  The international community 
was slow to identify and respond to the crisis of NCDs in the later part of the twentieth 
century.  However, in 2011 the United Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs recognized 
NCDs as one of the greatest threats to health and development in the twenty-first century, 
and a major topic for the post-2015 development agenda.  Notably, many experts, 
national governments, and global leaders have rallied for an inclusive, “whole-of-
government” and “whole-of-society” approach, situating public-private partnerships 
(“PPPs”) with some of the vectors of NCDs, in particular the food and beverage 
industries, as the necessary strategy to address the issue.  
Although PPPs in global health are not a new phenomenon, PPPs with the food and 
beverage industries require a greater level of scrutiny and caution.  The same level of 
vigilance should be applied when considering partnerships with the sugar-sweetened 
beverage (SSB) industry, as in the tobacco and firearms industries, which produce goods 
known to be antithetical to public health. We examine how major SSB companies, such 
as the Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo, have been viewed as legitimate actors and 
partners, despite employing coercive tactics similar to the tobacco industry. We question 
their assumed full participation and cooperation in global NCD initiatives and call for 
greater transparency in global NCD partnership development and policy dialogue, 
particularly in the implementation of the post-2015 development agenda.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Non-communicable diseases (“NCDs”) are a global public health 
crisis. The 2011 United Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs recognized 
NCDs as a critical threat to health and development in the twenty-first 
century.
1
  NCDs—heart disease, diabetes, cancer, and chronic lung 
                                                     
† Pediatric Health Program Manager, Allina Health (Minneapolis, MN). The opinions expressed in 
this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Allina Health. The author 
would like to thank Professor Taylor for her encouragement to pursue this project and invaluable insights to 
during this collaboration. 
† J.D., L.L.M., J.S.D. Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Adjunct 
Professor of international relations at the John Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
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1  U.N. General Assembly, Political Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly 
on the Prevention and Control of Non-communicable Diseases; Draft resolution submitted by the President 
of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/L.1 (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/vi
ew_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/L.1 [hereinafter Political Declaration]. 
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disease—and their shared modifiable risk factors—unhealthy diets, physical 
inactivity, alcohol abuse and tobacco use—caused almost 70 percent of the 
world’s 56 million deaths in 2012; roughly six times as many deaths as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined.
2
  Nearly three-quarters of 
these, and most premature deaths, occur in low- and middle-income 
countries.  Moreover, the burden of disease is expected to grow over the 
coming decades and will represent some 70 percent of global deaths in 
2030.
3 
Risk factors associated with NCDs are also on the rise in many low- 
and middle-income countries.  A “nutrition transition” has been well 
documented globally, with more populations consuming larger amounts of 
sugar, animal meat, and vegetable oils.
4
  Diets are also becoming 
increasingly energy-dense, with declining quality because of greater 
consumption of unhealthy foods, such as sugar-sweetened beverages 
(“SSBs”).
5
  For example, in the United States, SSBs are the primary source 
of added sugar.
6
  They also accounted for at least one-fifth of the weight 
gain in the US population between 1977 and 2007.
7
  SSB consumption 
impairs glucose and lipid metabolism, increases inflammation, and 
significantly increases the risk of obesity, type 2 diabetes, and other chronic 
diseases.
8   
As such, SSB consumption accelerates cellular aging and shortens 
life, with every eight-ounce serving of SSB consumed each day being 
equivalent to about 1.9 additional years of aging.
9
  Connections between 
                                                     
2  Global Status Report on Noncommunicable Diseases 2014: Attaining the nine global 
noncommunicable diseases targets; a shared responsibility, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 9 (2014), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/148114/1/9789241564854_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
3  Colin D. Mathers & Dejan Loncar,. Projections of Global Mortality and Burden of Disease from 
2002 to 2030, 3 PLOS MED. 2011, 2020-21 (2006). 
4  See Barry M Popkin, Global nutrition dynamics: the world is shifting rapidly toward a diet linked 
with noncommunicable disease, 84(2) AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 289 (2006). 
5  See Fumiaki Imamura, Dietary quality among men and women in 187 countries in 1990 and 2010: 
a systematic assessment, 3 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH, e132, 2015, at 2. 
6  See Accelerating Progress in Obesity Prevention, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADEMIES  (May 2012), http:// www.iom.edu/Reports/2012/Accelerating-Progressin-Obesity-
Prevention/~/media/Files/Report%20 Files/2012/APOP/IOM_FoodDrink_brief_v4.pdf. 
7  See Cynthia L. Ogden & Margaret D. Carroll et al., Prevalence of High Body Mass Index in US 
Children and Adolescents, 2007-2008, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 242 (2010). 
8  See Frank B. Hu & Vasanti S. Malik, Sugar-sweetened beverages and risk of obesity and type 2 
diabetes: Epidemiological evidence, 100 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 47 (2010); Isabelle Aeberli et al., Low to 
moderate sugar-sweetened beverage consumption impairs glucose and lipid metabolism and promotes 
inflammation in healthy young men: a randomized controlled trial, 94 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 479 
(2012). 
9  See Cindy W. Leung et al., Soda and cell aging: associations between sugar-sweetened beverage 
consumption and leukocyte telomere length in healthy adults from the National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Surveys, 104(12) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2425 (2014). 
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SSB consumption and weight gain have been found for both adult and 
adolescent populations.
10
  
Globally, one in three people are overweight or obese, increasing by 
1.3 billion people between 1980 and 2013.
11
  More than 60 percent of the 
world’s obese people live in developing countries, with 15 percent of the 
world’s obese people living in China and India alone.
12
  Projections also 
estimate the prevalence of type 2 diabetes will increase 170 percent in 
developing countries and 42 percent in developed countries between 1995 
and 2025, affecting an estimated 438 million individuals by 2030.
13 
The economic costs of the increasing NCD epidemic are 
unprecedented.  Collectively, NCDs are predicted to cost the global 
economy USD 47 trillion over the coming two decades.
14
  By 2030, diabetes 
will require USD 490 billion in health care expenditures globally.
15
  Obesity 
is also taking a toll on economies and health systems. Currently, obesity’s 
impact on global gross domestic product (“GDP”) amounts to USD 2.0 
trillion.
16
  For many countries, this impact is projected to increase.  For 
example, in the United States and United Kingdom, obesity-related medical 
costs are estimated to increase by USD 48–66 billion per year and by GBP 
1.9–2 billion per year respectively by 2030.
17 
Like many other global health challenges, effectively combatting 
NCDs cannot be addressed by the health sector alone, but rather requires 
multi-sectoral action.  One’s risk of developing cancer or heart disease, for 
example, are influenced by a multitude of factors controlled by any number 
of different sectors including: trade, agriculture, urban planning, 
environment, and financial policy.
18
  As a result, many experts, government 
                                                     
10  See Vasanti Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, Obesity, Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus, and 
Cardiovascular Disease Risk, 121 CIRCULATION J. 1356 (2010). 
11  See Marie Ng et al., Global, regional, and national prevalence of overweight and obesity in 
children and adults during 1980–2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013, 
384 THE LANCET 766 (2014). 
12  See id. 
13  See Hilary King et al., Global burden of diabetes, 1995-2025: prevalence, numerical estimates, 
and projections, 21 DIABETES CARE 1414 (1998); Frank B. Hu, Globalization of diabetes: the role of diet, 
lifestyle, and genes, 34(6) DIABETES CARE 1249 (2011).    
14  David E. Bloom et al., The Global Economic Burden of Non-communicable Diseases, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM 6 (Sept. 2011), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18806en/s18806en.pdf. 
15  Ping Zhang et al., Global healthcare expenditure on diabetes for 2010 and 2030, 87 DIABETES 
RES. & CLINICAL PRAC. 294, 294 (2010). 
16  Richard Dobbs et al., How the world could better fight obesity, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (Nov. 
2014), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_studies/how_the_world_could_better_fight_obesity. 
17  Y Claire Wang et al., Health and economic burden of the projected obesity trends in the USA and 
the UK, 378 THE LANCET 815, 815 (2011). 
18  Kumanan Rasanathan & Rüdiger Krech, Action on the social determinants of health is essential to 
tackle noncommunicable diseases, BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/10/11-094243/en/. 
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officials, and global leaders have rallied for an inclusive “whole-of-
government” and “whole-of-society” approach.  Such an approach would 
situate public-private partnerships (“PPPs”), including those with the food 
and beverage industries, as core and perhaps necessary vehicles to address 
NCDs.
19
  Some stakeholders from governments, international organizations, 
or public health organizations see these industries as possessing valuable 
resources (e.g., financial, human, technical, influential) that can be harnessed 
to improve health.
20
  
At the same time, business as a whole has a vested interest in NCDs. 
The profit and growth of some businesses, such as in the food and beverage 
industries that produce unhealthy food products, help encourage 
consumption of these products, increasing NCD risk.
21
  Further, with the 
economic development and population growth in Asia, Latin America, the 
Middle East, and Africa, companies see these regions as the most viable for 
increasing profit margins.  These are also the same regions that are projected 
to experience the largest increase in NCD burden in the coming decades.
22
  
However, this growth for companies is directly tied to the health and 
productivity of its workforce.
23
  NCDs and obesity pose significant threats to 
business, projected to cost the global economy trillions of dollars in the 
coming decades.
24
  These potential barriers to economic growth are of great 
concern for business. 
Although PPPs in global health are not a new phenomenon, 
partnerships with the food and beverage industries require a greater level of 
scrutiny than currently received. PPPs with industries such as tobacco and 
firearms, which manufacture products known to be antithetical to public 
health,
25
 have been widely rejected.
26
  However, opinions regarding the 
appropriate role of food and beverage companies are mixed, including for 
the two largest non-alcoholic multinational beverage companies—The Coca-
                                                     
19  See Political Declaration, supra note 1. 
20  Global Forum: Addressing the Challenges of Noncommunicable Diseases: Forum Report, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.who.int/nmh/events/global_forum_ncd/en/. 
21  See David Stuckler et al., Manufacturing Epidemics: The Role of Global Producers in Increased 
Consumption of Unhealthy Commodities Including Processed Foods, Alcohol, and Tobacco, 9 PLOS MED., 
e10011235, 2012. 
22  See Global Status report on noncommunicable diseases 2010, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 2011), 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789240686458_eng.pdf?ua=1. 
23  See Christine Hancock et al., The private sector, international development and NCDs, 7(23) 
Globalization & Health 1 (2011). 
24  See Dobbs, supra note 16; Bloom, supra note 14. 
25  See H. Kuper et al., Tobacco use and cancer causation: association by tumour type, 252 J. 
INTERNAL MED. 206 (2002). 
26  See Paul A. Simon & Jonathan E. Fielding, Public Health And Business: A Partnership That 
Makes Cents, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1029 (2006). 
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Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”) and PepsiCo.  Coca-Cola is the largest non-
alcoholic beverage company in the world, operating in more than 200 
countries and controlling 42 percent of the global SSB market.
27
  PepsiCo, 
which also sells unhealthy food products such as potato chips which 
comprise roughly half of its sales, controls an additional 30 percent of the 
global SSB market.
28
  While PepsiCo attempts to introduce new product 
lines marketed as healthier alternatives, such as Chobani Yogurt and Naked 
Juice smoothies, 75 percent of global sales for Coca-Cola remain in SSBs.29 
 Openness to engagement and partnership with these companies 
persists despite the growing evidence base that supports the link between 
SSB consumption and chronic conditions detrimental to health, such as 
obesity, metabolic syndrome, and type 2 diabetes.
30
  On the other hand, some 
food companies, have played roles in various initiatives and partnerships to 
help address global hunger, contributing to their perceived legitimacy in 
international development.
31
  As a result, partnerships that include these 
companies have received less scrutiny compared to the tobacco industry 
despite the global health impact of their products and the fact that these 
companies employ similar tactics to influence research, public opinion, and 
policy.  
Consideration of the role of PPPs with food and beverage companies 
is currently playing out within the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and 
as part of a broader debate on the post-2015 development agenda.32  United 
Nations Member States are in the process of determining Sustainable 
Development Goals, which will succeed the expiring Millennium 
Development Goals.  After a global consultation,
33
 a report by an 
independent high-level panel of eminent persons appointed by the Secretary 
General,
34
 and an Open Working Group process, Member States will 
consider a set of seventeen SDGs in September at the 68
th
 UN General 
                                                     
27  Coke Vs. Pepsi: By The Numbers, NASDAQ (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/coke-
vs-pepsi-by-the-numbers-cm337909. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Risk of Metabolic Syndrome and 
Type 2 Diabetes: A meta-analysis, 33 DIABETES CARE 2477 (2010). 
31  See Nutrition for Growth Commitments: Executive Summary, NUTRITION FOR GROWTH, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207274/nutrition-for-
growth-commitments.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015). 
32 See WHO Global Coordination Mechanism Working Groups, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/global-coordination-mechanism/working-groups/en/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
33  See THE WORLD WE WANT 2015, http://www.worldwewant2015.org (last visited May 16, 2015). 
34  See A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustain 
Development: The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 development 
Agenda (May 30, 2013), http://www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf. 
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Assembly.  A variety of non-State actors, including businesses, have 
weighed in on the proposal.
35
  A number of goals within the proposed SDGs 
relate to NCDs, including Goal 2 focused on nutrition, Goal 3 to ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being, and Goal 12 to ensure sustainable 
consumption and production patterns.  Lastly, Goal 17, like the MDGs, calls 
for partnership to “strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the 
global partnership for sustainable development.”
36 
As the post-2015 development agenda solidifies, partnerships will be 
a prominent strategy for governments, international organizations, and civil 
society to achieve the SDGs.  As stated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon during the release of his synthesis report on the post-2015 agenda, 
partnerships are an “essential element” for success, and further, the agenda 
“will be built on a foundation of global cooperation and solidarity.”
37 
With partnerships occupying such a prominent position within the 
post-2015 development agenda, the actors involved in them and the 
processes by which they emerge should be carefully considered.  Such 
partnerships, especially those involving the private sector, require judicious 
scrutiny and transparency of the actors involved and their interests to 
safeguard public interests.  More importantly, partnerships with industries 
whose products are detrimental to health, such as some of those produced by 
the food and beverage industry, require a more cautious approach to ensure 
the integrity of global NCD policymaking and governance.  
In this paper we discuss the evolution of the private sector in global 
health PPPs.  We then turn to examine current approaches within the UN 
system, including through the WHO with regard to engaging with the private 
sector.  This examination is followed by a detailed exploration of two case 
studies, the NCD Roundtable—convened by the Global Health Council—
and the Pan American Forum for Action on NCDs—convened by the Pan 
American Health Organization.  These case studies highlight various 
coercive tactics employed by Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, which are later 
discussed in a cautionary questioning and call for reconsideration of the 
current enthusiasm for PPPs at the WHO and the UN in the SDG agenda.  
                                                     
35  See U.N. Global Compact, The Role of Business and Finance in Supporting the Post-2015 Agenda 
(July 2, 2014), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.6/Post2015_WhitePaper_2July14.pd
f. 
36  See U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable 
Development Goals (Jan. 22, 2013), https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html [hereinafter 
Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals]; We End Poverty: Millennium 
Development Goals and Beyond 2015 (2015), http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml. 
37  See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General remarks to the General Assembly on the Synthesis 
Report on the Post-2015 Agenda (Dec. 4, 2014), www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8250. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL 
HEALTH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Public-private partnerships combine the unique assets from public and 
private actors to jointly address complex challenges that one sector cannot 
address alone.  At the global level, PPPs can be defined as “a collaborative 
relationship that transcends national boundaries and brings together at least 
two parties, among them a corporation (and/or industry association) and an 
intergovernmental organization, so as to achieve a shared health-creating 
goal on the basis of a mutually agreed division of labor.”
38
  In doing so, each 
individual partner brings a unique set of interests to bear, some of which are 
overtly disclosed, while others are not.  
Despite their popularity for addressing global development challenges 
the history of PPPs is short, their definition is inconsistent, and evidence to 
support them is weak.
39
  Prior to the late 1970s, relationships between public 
and private entities were filled with mistrust, precluding both from engaging 
in any meaningful collaboration within the UN system.
40
  Partnerships in 
international development were mostly between donors and recipient 
country governments.
41
  A significant ideological shift took place during the 
1980s and 1990s, marked by views that public and private sector 
collaboration was needed to “modify” inefficient markets for public good.
42 
Motivated by disillusionment with the pace of the UN and multilateral 
approaches generally, and the appeal of the private sector’s agility and 
efficiency, PPPs became an attractive option to “get things done” by the 
early 1990s.
43
  Although the global health community was slow to accept the 
private sector as a legitimate partner, the popularity of PPPs in global health 
rose steadily from the 1980s into the 2000s, catalyzed by the successful 
Mectizan Donation Program of the 1980s.
44
  The success of this partnership 
                                                     
38 Kent Buse, Global Public–Private Partnerships for Health: Part I – A New Development in 
Health?, 78 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 549, 550 (2000). 
39  See Public-Private Partnerships in developing countries, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFF. OF THE NETHERLANDS (2013), http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/IOBstudy378publicpriva
tepartnershipsindevelopingcountries.pdf [hereinafter Public-Private Partnerships]. 
40  Buse, supra note 38, at 551. 
41  See id. 
42  See id. 
43  See id. 
44  A PPP between the pharmaceutical company, Merck, and Latin American and Africa governments, 
this partnership leveraged the production capacity of Merck to supply needed medications to treat 
onchocerciasis, also known as river blindness, which currently infects about 37 million people, 99% of who 
live in sub-Saharan Africa.  Since it began, treatment donations exceed $1 billion for some 117,000 
communities in 28 countries.  See David H. Peters & Traci Phillips, Mectizan Donation Program: 
evaluation of a public-private partnership, 9 TROPICAL MED. & INT’L HEALTH A4 (2004); Peter J. Hotez & 
Aruna Kamath, Neglected Tropical Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of Their Prevalence, 
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helped calm some previously held suspicions of forming partnerships with 
industry, and launched a wave of new global health PPPs between 1982 and 
2003.  Many of these PPPs were with pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies, who emerged as the first logical partners to advance global 
health.  These PPPs emerged at the same time as public health threats, such 
as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, inundated developing country 
governments.  This presented a growing need for financial resources, new 
drugs and medical technologies, and more extensive distribution and 
delivery networks to facilitate access to life-saving treatments.  As a result, a 
growing consensus developed that partnerships with the private sector were 
not only important, but also essential in a world of increasing 
interdependence.
45 
The 2000 United Nations Millennium Declaration—which formed the 
backdrop for the Millennium Development Goals—and the United Nations 
General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS in 2001—the first-ever 
high-level meeting devoted exclusively to a health topic—catalyzed and 
propelled PPPs into the mainstream in global health.
46
  States resolved to 
“develop strong partnerships with the private sector” as part of the 
Millennium Declaration, and partnerships emerged as one of eight explicit 
MDGs, with a significant focus on cooperation with pharmaceutical 
companies to expand access to affordable essential drugs in developing 
countries.
47
  A similar emphasis continued with global approaches to address 
HIV/AIDS in the Declaration of Commitment, including a commitment by 
Member States to “foster stronger collaboration and the development of 
innovative partnerships between the public and private sectors.”
48
  The 
Declaration went further to “establish and strengthen” decision-making 
mechanisms “that involve the private sector and civil society partners.”
49
  
Alongside the Millennium Declaration, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
                                                                                                                                                              
Distribution, and Disease Burden, 3 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES e412 (2009); B. Colatrella, The 
Mectizan Donation Program: 20 years of successful collaboration – a retrospective, 102ANNALS OF 
TROPICAL MED. & PARASITOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT ISSUE 1) 7 (2008). 
45  See Kent Buse & Andrew Harmer, Power to the Partners? The Politics of Public-Private Health 
Partnership, 47 DEV. 49 (2004); Judith Richter, Public-private Partnerships for Health: A Trend with no 
Alternatives?, 47 DEV. 43 (2004). 
46  See U.N General Assembly, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS: United Nations Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS (June 25, 2001), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/sub_landing/files/aidsdecl
aration_en_0.pdf [hereinafter Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS]. 
47  See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 
2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. 
48  Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, supra note 46, at 18. 
49  Id.  
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also established the United Nations Global Compact in 2000, a business 
alliance that partners with the UN and UN specialized agencies.
50
  
Though the private sector was not directly involved in their 
governance, public international organizations, such as the United Nations 
Joint Programme on AIDS (“UNAIDS”) and the WHO, strengthened their 
engagement with the private sector in the 2000s, and developed explicit 
guidelines to inform these partnerships.
51
  Many of the new global health 
PPPs, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(“GFATM”), Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (“GAIN”), and the 
Gavi Alliance (“GAVI”) include the private sector in some capacity on their 
governing boards.
52
  Previous analyses of these types of global health PPPs 
established evidence of their beneficial contributions, both in terms of 
stakeholder participation and impact.
53
  These results have supported an 
increasing shift in financing global development, with roughly one-third of 
official development assistance now flowing through global and regional 
PPPs.
54
  
 
II. GLOBAL HEALTH PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS WITH FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE CORPORATIONS 
 
Global PPPs created to address NCDs have attracted considerable 
attention and scrutiny, particularly surrounding the role of companies whose 
products contribute to ill health.  The global health community widely 
agrees on the necessity to closely regulate the tobacco industry and exclude 
it from any health PPPs.
55
 the WHO policy explicitly prohibits the 
organization from accepting funding from the tobacco industry.  Further, in 
2003 Member States adopted the Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (“FCTC”), one of the most widely ratified treaties in UN history and 
                                                     
50  See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited May 16, 
2015). 
51  See Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, UNAIDS Guidelines: Working in Partnership 
with the Private Sector (Aug. 2007), http://data.unaids.org/pub/Manual/2007/unaids_guidelines_august200
7_draft4_en.pdf. 
52  See Keith Bezanson & Paul Isenman, Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges, 
Weaknesses, and Lessons, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Oct. 2012), http://www.cgdev.org/files/1426627_file_
Bezanson_Isenman_FINAL.pdf. 
53  See Global Health Partnerships: Assessing Country Consequences, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2005), 
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/gf16.pdf; Kent Buse & Sonja Tanaka, Global Public-Private Health 
Partnerships: Lessons learned from ten years of experience and evaluation, 61 INT’L DENTAL J. 2 
(SUPPLEMENT ISSUE 2) (2011). 
54  See Uma Lele et al., The Changing Aid Architecture: Can Global Initiatives Eradicate Poverty?, 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. (2006),  http://www.oecd.org/dac/37034781.pdf. 
55  See Anna B. Gilmore et al., Public health, corporations and the New Responsibility Deal: 
promoting partnerships with vectors of disease?, 33  J. PUB. HEALTH 2 (2011). 
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the first convention established under the auspices of the WHO.
56
  The UN, 
the WHO, and other public health authorities have widely affirmed the 
position that tobacco companies can never be suitable partners.  As the 
WHO Director-General Margaret Chan emphatically reinforced at the 66th 
World Health Assembly, “the WHO will never be on speaking terms with the 
tobacco industry.”
57
  Thus, there is a clear conflict of interest for 
governments and health organization to partner with the tobacco industry. 
 The role that the food and beverage industries should play in global 
PPPs and policymaking lacks consensus.  Food and beverage companies 
have a history of some positive contributions to global health, particularly in 
the areas of micronutrient fortification to address malnutrition.
58
  More 
recently, companies such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have involved 
themselves in a broad range of development initiatives and partnerships, 
contributing valuable resources to address food insecurity and clean water, 
for example.
59
  These contributions come at a time of stagnant donor 
resources, such as from the United States Government.
60 
 Industry executives claim they are simply trying to leverage their 
scale for social good, as Muhtar Kent, CEO and Chairman of the Board of 
Coca-Cola argued in a recent interview.61  Indra Nooyi, CEO of PepsiCo, 
has made similar comments: “Large companies are powerful—they can play 
a big role—so we need to work with governments to provide solutions.”
62
 
                                                     
56 See Ruth Roemer et al., Origins of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 95 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 936 (2005). 
57 Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General addresses the Sixty-sixth World Health Assembly, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (May 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2013/world_health_assembly_20130520/e
n/. 
58 See Kraisid Tontisirin et al., Food-Based Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Micronutrient 
Malnutrition in the Developing World, 61 PROC. NUTRITION SOC’Y 243 (2002). 
59 For example, in 2011 PepsiCo established a partnership with the World Food Program, United 
States Agency for International Development and the government of Ethiopia, called “Enterprise 
EthioPEA,” to improve the productivity of Ethiopian chickpea farmers and connect these farmers to 
PepsiCo’s global supply chain.  The Coca-Cola Foundation’s flagship initiative, the Replenish Africa 
Initiative (RAIN), is a six-year, $30 million commitment to improve access to clean water for 2 million 
people in Africa by 2015.  According to the company’s website, the initiative supported access to clean 
water for 800,000 people as of 2014, less than half of its 2015 goal, and access to sanitation for 130,000 
people. 
60 See Adam Wexler & Jennifer Kates, The U.S Global Health Budget: Analysis of the Fiscal Year 
2015 Budget Request, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://kff.org/global-
health-policy/issue-brief/the-u-s-global-health-budget-analysis-of-the-fiscal-year-2015-budget-request/. 
61 Amy Gallo, The CEO of Coca-Cola on Using the Company’s Scale for Good, HARVARD BUS. REV. 
(May 29, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/the-ceo-of-coca-cola-on-using-the-companys-scale-for-good/. 
62 John Seabrook, Snacks for a fat planet: PepsiCo takes stock of the obesity epidemic, THE NEW 
YORKER (May 16, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/16/snacks-for-a-fat-planet. 
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Countless other food industry executives have voiced similar sentiments, 
such as Unilever CEO Paul Polman.
63
  
The global health and international development communities have 
been quick to accept the recent socially-conscious sentiments of many major 
food and beverage companies, despite the unintended consequence of 
legitimizing them in the process.  A recent example is Coca-Cola’s strategic 
partnership with the GFATM, announced in 2010, to improve the 
distribution of medical supplies across Ethiopia.
64
  Two years later, the 
GFATM announced an expanded partnership with Coca-Cola to deliver 
medicines to remote parts of the world as part of the “Project Last Mile.”
65
  
Similarly, PepsiCo and the Clinton Foundation launched a strategic 
partnership in 2014 to source cashew fruit from smallholder farmers in India 
which will in turn create a new ingredient supply for PepsiCo products.
66
  
Also, companies such as PepsiCo, Unilever and Yum! Brands all partner 
with the World Food Program, the United Nation system’s lead agency on 
fighting hunger worldwide.
67
  
Food and beverage companies have also banded together to form 
partnerships and make voluntary commitments to improve their products and 
public health. The International Food and Beverage Alliance (“IFBA”)
68
 and 
the Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation
69
 are two examples of such 
collaborations, and include many of the largest food and beverage 
companies, including Coca-Cola and PepsiCo.  Members of these groups 
have pledged to reformulate their products to make them healthier, to 
improve product nutrition information for consumers, and to restrict 
                                                     
63  Lawrence MacDonald, The Surprising and Sensible Remarks of Unilever CEO Paul Polman, CTR. 
FOR GLOBAL DEV. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.cgdev.org/blog/surprising-and-sensible-remarks-unilever-
ceo-paul-polman. 
64  See Coca-Cola – sharing skills, saving lives: Leveraging business innovations to improve delivery 
of lifesaving drugs, THE GLOBAL FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/partners/privatesector/cocacola/ 
(last visited May 16, 2015). 
65  See Press Release, The Global Fund, Coca-cola and the Global Fund Announce Partnership to 
Help Bring Critical Medicines to Remote Regions (Sept. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/mediacenter/newsreleases/2012-09-25_Coca-cola_and_the_Global_Fund
_Announce_Partnership_to_Help_Bring_Critical_Medicines_to_Remote_Regions/. 
66  See Press Release, Clinton Foundation, Clinton Foundation and Pepsico Launch Strategic 
Partnership to Spur Social and Economic Development in Emerging Markets (May 22, 2014), available at 
https://www.clintonfoundation.org/press-releases/clinton-foundation-and-pepsico-launch-strategic-partners
hip-spur-social-and-economic. 
67  See Meet our Partners, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/partners/private-
sector/meet-our-partners (last visited May 16, 2015). 
68  See INTERNATIONAL FOOD & BEVERAGE ALLIANCE, https://ifballiance.org/ (last visited May 16, 
2015). 
69  See HEALTHY WEIGHT COMMITMENT FOUNDATION, http://www.healthyweightcommit.org/ (last 
visited May 16, 2015). 
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unhealthy food marketing to children under the age of twelve.
70
  Progress 
has been mixed, in some cases and there remains a significant gap between 
company pledges and current practices (e.g., food marketing).
71
  Such 
voluntary commitments at the global and national levels have also been 
widely criticized as establishing weak or vague standards without strong 
independent oversight, regulation, and evaluation.
72  
Despite industry claims of their positive contributions and the 
recognized benefits of cooperation, such close involvement can bias 
otherwise impartial ventures.  Currently, private resources are flowing into 
public health research and professional associations.
73
  Such contributions 
have helped finance the endowments of large global health foundations in 
the past.
74
  In addition, foreign direct investment by corporations amounted 
to more than USD 470 billion in 2011, and is believed to be approaching 
USD 1 trillion.
75
  This influx of private funds comes at an opportune time for 
business when only about 3 percent of development assistance for health is 
dedicated to NCDs.
76
  With limited public investment in NCD prevention 
and control, the impact of private funding is even more influential.  
According to David Stuckler, a professor of political economy and 
sociology at University of Oxford, companies that produce SSBs are 
employing similar tactics as the tobacco industry, in order to “divert[ ] the 
agenda and bias[ ] the science.”
77
  For example, a 2013 systematic review 
found that industry-funded studies examining the relationship between SSBs 
and weight gain or obesity were “five times more likely to present a 
                                                     
70  See Our Commitments, INTERNATIONAL FOOD & BEVERAGE ALLIANCE, https://ifballiance.org/our-
commitments/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
71  See Corinna Hawkes & Jennifer L Harris, An analysis of the content of food industry pledges on 
marketing to children, 14 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 1403 (2011). 
72  See Michele Roberts et al., Compliance with children’s television food advertising regulations in 
Australia, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 846 (2012); Corinna Hawkes, Self-regulation of food advertising: what it 
can, could and cannot do to discourage unhealthy eating habits among children, 30 NUTRITION BULL. 374 
(2005); Sharron Bowers et al., Does current industry self-regulation of food marketing in New Zealand 
protect children from exposure to unhealthy food advertising?, CANCER SOC’Y OF NEW ZEALAND (2012), 
http://www.otago.ac.nz/wellington/otago036971.pdf. 
73  See David Stuckler et al., Global Health Philanthropy and Institutional Relationships: How 
Should Conflicts of Interest Be Addressed?, 8 PLOS MED., e1001020, 2011. 
74  See id. 
75  Michel Sidibé, Why We Need The Private Sector And Why It Needs Us: Governing Global Health 
Differently Post-2015, GLOBAL HEALTH & DIPLOMACY (2015), http://onlinedigeditions.com/article/Why_
We_Need_The_Private_Sector_And_Why_It_Needs_Us%3A_Governing_Global_Health_Differently_Pos
t-2015/1910242/242901/article.html. 
76  Rachel A. Nugent & Andrea B. Feigl, Where Have All The Donors Gone? Scarce Donor Funding 
For Non-Communicable Diseases 16 (Ctr. for Global Development, Working Paper 228, 2010), available 
at http://www.cgdev.org/publication/where-have-all-donors-gone-scarce-donor-funding-non-
communicable-diseases-working-paper. 
77  Jonathan Gornall, Sugar’s web of influence 2: Biasing the science, 350 BMJ 1 (2015). 
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conclusion of no positive association.”
78
  Private industry also influences 
professional associations, some of which produce their own research and are 
leading authorities in promulgating evidence-based public health guidelines.  
For example, the American College of Sports Medicine has a stated mission 
to “advance and integrate scientific research to provide educational and 
practical applications of exercise science and sports medicine.”
79
  But one of 
its prominent global health initiatives, Exercise is Medicine, includes Coca-
Cola as one of its two sole funders.  Similarly, the American Academy of 
Family Practice received a large donation from Coca-Cola to support patient 
education on obesity prevention.
80
  In addition, former employees of 
PepsiCo played prominent roles in workshops and reports produced by the 
Institute of Medicine, including one’s focused on cardiovascular disease 
prevention in developing countries, country-level decision making for 
controlling NCDs, and PPPs for global health.
81 
The food and beverage industry’s involvement in global health may be 
less overt, but still influential.  For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation the largest private foundation in the United States and is a 
leading funder of global health initiatives with assets of almost USD 30 
billion, has maintained significant ties to food and beverage companies and 
the pharmaceutical industry for a number of years.
82
  In 2012, the 
Foundation held 9.4 million shares in McDonald’s stock (or about 5 percent 
of its portfolio) and more than 15 million shares in Coca-Cola stock (over 7 
percent of its portfolio).
83
  The Foundation’s largest holding is in Berkshire 
Hathaway, which represents 49.75 percent of its portfolio, or USD 5.9 
billion.  Berkshire Hathaway, in turn, has its largest holding in The Coca-
Cola Company, representing more than 20 percent of its portfolio, or roughly 
USD 10 billion.
84
  In early 2015, the Gates Foundation announced the sale of 
its stock holdings in both McDonald’s and Coca-Cola during the fourth 
                                                     
78  Maira Bes-Rastrollo et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest and Reporting Bias Regarding the 
Association between Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Weight Gain: A Systematic Review of Systematic 
Reviews, 10 PLOS MED., e1001578, 2013, at 2. 
79  About ACSM, AM. COLLEGE OF SPORTS MED., http://www.acsm.org/about-acsm/who-we-are (last 
visited May 16, 2015). 
80  Howard Brody, Professional Medical Organizations and Commercial Conflicts of Interest: 
Ethical Issues, 8 ANNALS OF FAMILY MED. 354, 354 (2010). 
81  See, e.g., Directory: Committee Member – Dr. Derek Yach, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADEMIES, http://iom.edu/Global/Directory/Detail.aspx?id=0020019489 (last visited May 16, 2015). 
82 Stuckler, supra note 73, at 4. 
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84  Id. at 5. 
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quarter of 2014, a combined 32.3 million shares valued at USD 1.9 billion.
85
  
However, the Gates Foundation continues to hold investments in Berkshire 
Hathaway.
86 
Although partnerships with food and beverage companies have 
contributed positively to global development, their unchecked infiltration 
into developing country markets can have negative consequences for public 
health.  The case of Brazil is a prime example.  Several multinational food 
and beverage companies, namely Nestle and Coca-Cola, have penetrated 
even the most remote areas of the country, using door-to-door marketing 
tactics, and targeting low-income consumers.87  In a globalized food system 
and increased urbanization, developing countries and emerging economies 
are experiencing an influx of SSBs that are displacing traditional diets and 
contributing to obesity and NCDs, such as cardiovascular disease and type 2 
diabetes.
88   
III. CURRENT UN APPROACHES TO PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
Calls for “multi-sectoral” or “multi-stakeholder” collaborations, 
particularly to address global NCDs, are widespread among governments 
and intergovernmental organizations, including UN, the WHO, PAHO, the 
World Bank, and others.
89
  Currently, States are negotiating the post-2015 
development agenda at the UN, where health, NCDs, and nutrition are likely 
to feature prominently.
90
  Partnerships continue to be a major discussion 
topic and a key point of emphasis, raising questions about how they can be 
effectively used to achieve goals in each thematic area of the proposed 
                                                     
85  Lauren Streib, Gates Foundation Ditches McDonald’s, Coca-Cola in Fourth Quarter, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-17/gates-foundation-
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86  Id. 
87  Carlos Monteiro & Geoffrey Cannon, The Impact of Transnational “Big Food” Companies on the 
South: A View from Brazil, 9 PLoS Med., e1001252, 2012, at 3. 
88  See Vasanti S. Malik et al., Global Obesity: Trends, Risk Factors and Policy Implications, 9 
NATURE REV. ENDOCRINOLOGY 13 (2013); Eric L Ding & Vasanti S Malik, Convergence of Obesity and 
High Glycemic Diet on Compounding Diabetes and Cardiovascular Risks in Modernizing China: An 
Emerging Public Health Dilemma, 4 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, 2008; Hu, supra note 13; Prakash S. 
Shetty, Nutrition Transition in India, 5 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 175 (2002). 
89  Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases, 2013-2020,  
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 3 (2013), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/94384/1/9789241506236_eng.pdf 
[hereinafter Global Action Plan].  See Mirta Rose, Building a Healthier World by Tackling 
Noncommunicable Diseases, 16 J. HEALTH COMMUNC’N 3 (2011).  
90  Open Working Group Proposal for Sustainable Development Goals, supra note 32. 
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SDGs being considered at the forthcoming UN General Assembly in 
September 2015.
91
  
Dialogue and policymaking on the WHO’s relationship with non-state 
actors, including the food and beverage industry is playing out 
simultaneously within several processes. One process is specifically relates 
to global NCDs and the other relates to the WHO governance more broadly. 
Pertaining to NCDs, the WHO is responsible for facilitating actions 
identified by Member States in the Political Declaration of the 2011 United 
Nations High Level Meeting on NCDs, including a new global NCD action 
plan, and a new global coordinating mechanism that aims to “facilitate and 
enhance…multi-stakeholder engagement and action across sectors.”92  The 
Global Coordinating Mechanism (“GCM”) for NCDs is charged with 
“facilitat[ing] engagement among Member States, United Nations funds, 
programmes and agencies, and other international partners, and non-State 
actors” to inform the WHO governing bodies.
93
  For the GCM, the WHO 
defines non-State actors as “academia and relevant nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as selected private sector entities, as appropriate,” but 
only explicitly excludes the tobacco industry from consideration. 
This inclusive approach slightly contrast with how the role of the food 
and beverage industry is considered within broader the WHO reforms. 
Member States at the May 2015 World Health Assembly will consider a new 
“framework of engagement with non-State actors.”94  The outcomes of this 
process are intended to produce clearer guidelines and procedures for how 
the WHO will engage with the private sector, including food and beverage 
companies.  Based on views expressed by Member States regarding the 
WHO’s proposed framework, some governments remain wary of direct 
global alliance with the food and beverage industries, and view them in a 
similar vein as the tobacco and firearms industries.  Pertaining to entities 
with which the WHO will not engage, the proposed framework says, 
“although there is agreement that the WHO should not engage with the 
tobacco and arms industries, this restriction, in the view of a number of 
                                                     
91  See General Assembly, The road to dignity by 2030: ending poverty, transforming all lives and 
protecting the planet, U.N. Doc. A/69/700 (Dec. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E. 
92  WHO Global Coordination Mechanism on the Prevention and Control of NCDs, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., http://www.who.int/nmh/ncd-coordination-mechanism/en/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
93  Draft Terms of Reference for a Global Coordination Mechanism for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1 (2013), http://www.who.int/cardiovascular_diseases/
GCM_First_WHO_Discussion_Paper_FINAL_CORR2.pdf?ua=1. 
94  Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, Report by the Secretariat, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. 1 (2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB136/B136_5-en.pdf. 
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Member States, should be extended to others, including notably the alcohol, 
food and beverage industries.”
95
  
However, to date normative guidelines and strategies produced by the 
WHO have refrained from excluding the food and beverage industries from 
active participation in NCD partnerships and initiatives.  Instead, the Global 
Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, the 2008-2013 Action Plan 
for the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable 
Diseases, and the 2013-2020 Global Action Plan for the Prevention and 
Control of Noncommunicable Diseases all advocate for partnerships and 
cooperation with relevant private actors.  In some of these documents, such 
as the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, there is an 
explicit commitment from the WHO to “hold discussions with the 
transnational food industry and other parts of the private sector in support of 
the aims of the Strategy, and of implementing the recommendations in 
countries.”
96
  Elsewhere in the Global Strategy, the WHO contends that “the 
private sector can be a significant player in promoting healthy diets.”
97
  The 
new 2013-2020 Global Strategy on NCDs continues this emphasis on 
partnerships, and a commitment from the WHO to “facilitate coordination, 
collaboration and cooperation among the main stakeholders including . . . 
the private sector.”
98
  
As these processes unfold, the role of partnerships will likely remain 
at the forefront. Past experiences interacting with the food and beverage 
industry can help guide how the UN, the WHO, and other normative and 
global health policy-making institutions should proceed as they consider the 
role of PPPs within the SDGs.  These experiences are discussed in the 
following case studies. 
 
IV. CASE STUDIES OF BEVERAGE COMPANY INFLUENCE ON GLOBAL NCDS 
The following two case studies examine tactics utilized by major 
SSBs, especially Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, to directly influence global policy 
discourse on NCDs.  The first case study is the NCD Roundtable, a civil 
society coalition that included NGOs, universities, think tanks, and private 
sector as members.  The second case study is the Pan American Forum for 
Action on NCDs—a platform established by the Pan American Health 
                                                     
95  Id. at 3. 
96 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 11,  
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97  Id. at 13. 
98  Global Action Plan, supra note 89, at 16. 
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Organization, the WHO’s regional office of the Americas.  This case study 
represents a more typical public-private partnership model with government, 
NGO, academic, and private sector members.  Each case study focuses 
heavily on global NCD policy-making processes, including the 2011 UN 
High Level Meeting on NCDs and the World Health Assembly.  Despite 
important differences the following examination of the tactics employed to 
advance corporate interests in global health suggests the need for greater 
care when considering the ethics and efficacy of future partnerships with the 
SSB industry. 
A. The NCD Roundtable 
Launched by the Global Health Council (“GHC”) in December 2010, 
the NCD Roundtable (“NCDRT”) was founded as “a coalition of civil 
society organizations, including NGOs, academia, research institutions and 
the private sector, working to raise the profile of NCDs through policy 
dialogue and engagement, partnership building, and grassroots 
mobilization.”
99
  When founded, the GHC was the largest membership 
organization devoted to global health.
100
  GHCs initial motivation to launch 
the NCDRT was based on member demands that the GHC organize its 
membership to establish and stake policy positions on key issues relevant to 
the High Level Meeting and World Health Organization deliberations on 
NCDs.
101 
The NCDRT functioned similarly to GHC’s other issue-specific 
roundtables. However, the private sector was not generally a major voice at 
these other roundtables, except for pharmaceutical and medical technologies 
companies that participated on a limited basis.
102
  In stark contrast, a number 
of prospective private sector members of GHC appeared to join the 
organization specifically to participate in the NCDRT.  These companies, 
which included PepsiCo and Coca-Cola, were not active in any other 
roundtable convened by GHC.  However, they were regular participants in 
the NCDRT and were active in discussions about advocacy strategy and 
policy recommendations.
103
  Notably, some private sector organizations, 
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100  About Us, GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL, http://globalhealth.org/about-us/mission-and-vision/ (last 
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including food and beverage companies, even inquired about a separate 
membership for just the NCDRT.
104 
The NCDRT’s institutional diversity was a unique characteristic of the 
coalition that it openly marketed to outside stakeholders, including 
governmental, inter-governmental, and private sector entities as well as 
prospective new members.  In essence, the “democratic” nature of the 
coalition gave equal voice to all parties, including private sector food and 
beverage industry members.
105
  Each member had an opportunity to 
participate in generating consensus policy recommendations.
106
  In theory, 
each member held an equal seat at the decision-making table of the coalition.  
This type of co-mingling of stakeholders advantaged more powerful entities, 
who could sway discussions simply by their mere presence.
107 
This inclusive approach to decision-making was particularly relevant 
when developing policy recommendations.  For example, a primary activity 
of the NCDRT in preparation regional preparatory meetings convened by the 
WHO and its regional offices was to develop a set of consensus policy 
recommendations to use in advocacy targeting the US Government, the 
WHO, and other decision-makers.108  The final document, entitled Global 
Leadership, Local Solutions: Mobilizing for NCDs, stood as a “statement of 
the Global Health Council.”
109
  All of the eighty-plus organizations 
participating in the NCDRT had the opportunity to contribute to the 
document, and make recommendations on its contents, including Coca-Cola 
and PepsiCo. This process, which was afforded a high degree of legitimacy 
because it was led by and in the name of GHC, was an indirect way for 
beverage companies to influence policy recommendations on global 
NCDs.
110
  Global Leadership, Local Solutions, in turn, was used in meetings 
with government officials who were directly involved in negotiating global 
NCD policy, including the UN High Level Meeting’s Political 
Declaration.
111
  
At the center of these policy recommendations was an unambiguous 
endorsement of “multi-sector partnerships,” or “whole-of-society” 
approaches, including the private sector at national and international 
                                                     
104 Id. 
105  Id. 
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108  See Concept Paper, GLOBAL HEALTH COUNCIL NCD ROUNDTABLE, http://ncdalliance.org/sites/de
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levels.
112
  These recommendations also failed to mention any public health 
regulatory approaches to NCDs, despite evidence supporting the efficacy of 
such approaches,
113
 implying the need for voluntary commitments and 
action. Indeed, an explicit call for partnership with the private sector, 
including the food and beverage industries but excluding tobacco, 
consistently ran through the events and documents produced by GHC 
regarding global NCDs.
114
 In addition, the recommendations take a 
favorable position towards accepting and even promoting financing from 
private sector sources, including major beverage corporations.
115
  
Industry-sponsored GHC events on global NCDs during 2011 also 
provided PepsiCo and Coca-Cola with both a façade of legitimacy as an 
equal partner within the public health community, and significant access to 
policy-makers who were directly involved with the proceedings of the UN 
High Level Meeting.  One event, held at the United Nations, was a “multi-
stakeholder dialogue” around approaches to global NCDs.
 116
  As in the 
process for developing the GHC policy positions on global NCDs, this event 
GHC’s global health brand legitimized industry perspectives, and afforded 
beverage industry representatives access to key players and decision-makers 
on international NCD policy.  The event was co-sponsored by PepsiCo, 
along with two organizations in which food and beverage companies are 
heavily involved - the World Economic Forum and UN Global Compact.117  
In addition, representatives from PepsiCo and Coca-Cola occupied 
prominent roles in the meeting’s agenda.  Meeting participants included 
representatives from various government embassies to the UN, as well as the 
Ambassadors from Jamaica and Luxembourg, who at the time, served as co-
facilitators of the UN High Level Meeting on NCDs.
118
  Industry influenced 
the planning and execution of the event by sponsoring it. In turn, GHC 
established PepsiCo and Coca-Cola as equal partners. 
The High Level Meeting’s Political Declaration reflected the 
heightened attention to multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder engagement and 
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partnerships.  The term multi-sectoral appears in the Political Declaration 
fifteen times, and an entire section is devoted to “whole-of-government” and 
“whole-of-society” actions, the latter implying partnerships with the food 
and beverage industries.  Again, this designation includes the food and 
beverage industries, while Member States agreed that only the tobacco 
industry has a “fundamental conflict of interest” with public health. 
Beverage companies also took advantage of GHC’s intimate 
relationship with the WHO and the UN to gain access to global policy-
making deliberations and provide formal recommendations to influence 
policy-making.  As an organization in official relations with the WHO and as 
an accredited member of the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations, GHC and its delegation participated at international meetings on 
NCDs such as the World Health Assembly.  UN High Level Meeting on 
NCDs, and the Civil Society Consultation Hearing that preceded the High 
Level Meeting.  Although many of these meetings would not have otherwise 
be open to the private sector, representatives from Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and 
the International Food Information Council Foundation,
119
 an industry-
funded front group,
120
 all participated on GHC delegations to these meetings 
in 2011 and in subsequent years.
121 
  Given such access, these groups held 
                                                     
119  Industry front groups are a well-documented tactic by industry to dispute science and create doubt. 
In the case of tobacco, industry-funded front groups acted as pawns, opposing federal legislation and 
regulation that would be harmful to the tobacco industry.  In some cases, front group lobbyists were used in 
the place of tobacco industry lobbyists to oppose such measures as excise taxes, indoor air pollution, and 
tobacco control in general.  Public health advocates have continued to emphasize similarities with the food 
and beverage industry, which funds similar front groups, nutrition research, and pays scientists as 
consultants.  Like the tobacco industry, front groups representing food and beverage industry interests 
emphasize voluntary self-regulation, and adhere to principles and guidelines which they themselves create, 
whether related to the consumption of unhealthy foods, or how conflict of interest measures should be 
structured.  These recommendations are also often published in peer-reviewed academic journals, a tactic to 
help portray them as credible. 
The practice is alarmingly widespread and entrenched.  A recent investigation published in The BMJ 
found: 
[F]or more than a decade funding from industry has flowed to scientists involved with the [human 
nutrition] research unit [of the Medical Research Council]. Scientists working on Medical Research 
Council (MRC) projects have received research funding from organisations including Coca-Cola, 
PepsiCo, Nestlé, [and] the Institute of Brewing and Distilling. 
Jonathan Gornall, Sugar: Spinning a Web of Influence, 350 BMJ 1 (2015). 
In some instances, industry supported up to 5% of the total operating budget of the human nutrition 
unit at MRC, or £380 874 (approximately $586,450).  Such financial connections fundamentally influence 
the results of research.  For example, a 2013 review of sugary drink consumption and weight gain or 
obesity found that industry-funded studies were “five times more likely to present a conclusion of no 
positive association” compared to those that weren’t.  Bes-Rastrollo, supra note 78. 
120  See MICHELE SIMON, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, BEST PUBLIC RELATIONS THAT MONEY CAN 
BUY: A GUIDE TO FOOD INDUSTRY FRONT GROUPS (2013). 
121  UN Informal Interactive Hearing, NCD ROUNDTABLE, http://www.ncdroundtable.org/2014/07/un-
informal-interactive-hearing/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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influential side events at major UN meetings and provided formal 
recommendations on global NCD policy.
122
  
An important strategy to improve the standing of these companies 
within global public health circles, as practiced by the tobacco industry, was 
to hire prominent experts to increase company activity and image around the 
UN High Level Meeting.  In the case of PepsiCo, the company gave a 
prominent role at the NCD Summit to Derek Yach, a former Executive 
Director at the WHO that had been tapped by PepsiCo years earlier as the 
Senior Vice President for Global Health and Agriculture Policy.
123
  Yach’s 
history with the WHO is important to note because of the agency’s central 
role in global NCD policymaking and his connections with global health 
policymakers within the WHO and countries around the world.  While 
Executive Director of NCDs at the WHO, Yach helped strengthen the 
organization’s relationship with the food and beverage industry.
124
  Notably, 
during Yach’s tenure at PepsiCo, instead of carving a different path forward, 
PepsiCo continued similar tactics to influence public policy and sway public 
opinion.  The company continued to emphasize self-regulation, its 
participation in voluntary commitment organizations, and the positive 
contributions it could make in public-private partnerships.125  
There are a number of plausible reasons for the NCDRT’s approach to 
private sector participation. While the exact reasons may never be known, 
the timing of private sector organizations’ participation is critical. Their 
                                                     
122  Kimberly Reed, “Remember the People” in Communicating About Food, GLOBAL HEALTH 
COUNCIL BLOG (May 19, 2011), http://www.globalhealth.org/remember-the-people-in-communicating-
about-food/. 
123  International Health Policy Analyst Derek Yach Joins the Vitality Group, PRNEWSWIRE (Oct. 23, 
2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/international-health-policy-analyst-derek-yach-joins-the-
vitality-group-175389031.html. 
124 In the early 2000’s, the WHO held private meetings with companies like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, 
Unilever and Nestle to consider their views while developing the 2002 World Health Report, focused on 
promoting healthy living.  Yach, who also served as chair of the WHO Reference Group, which advised on 
the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, helped arrange ongoing consultations with the 
food and beverage industries while developing the new global strategy.  At the time, the WHO viewed the 
food and beverage industry as fundamentally distinct from the tobacco industry, though the organization 
also claimed SSBs contributed to obesity and declining health. Despite this stance, a number of media 
reports at the same time documented evidence of industry influence and claimed the organization was 
“infiltrated by [the] food industry…just as the tobacco industry did.”  Speaking on behalf of the WHO, 
Yach responded to the criticism, and said, 
…food is not tobacco. The food and beverage industries are a part of the solution. They have an 
important role to play in achieving the best possible global strategy. We have been arranging a 
series of transparent discussions where all parties can discuss practical solutions for better diet, 
which do not in any way compromise the interests of public health. 
Statement, World Health Organization, WHO welcomes media focus on key global health issue of diet and 
chronic diseases (Jan. 3 2003), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2003/statement1/en/. 
125  See Derek Yach et al., The Role and Challenges of the Food Industry in Addressing Chronic 
Diseases, 6 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH 1 (2010).   
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involvement in global NCD policy issues significantly increased around the 
time of the UN High Level Meeting, which presented significant opportunity 
for them to influence global policy that would affect their brand and 
products.  This strategic increase in “socially responsible” activities during 
this time allowed PepsiCo and Coca-Cola to paint a public image of 
themselves as responsible corporate citizens.  These perceived positive 
contributions to global NCD efforts helped overshadow any critique 
associated with products they manufacture that might be detrimental to 
health and contribute to the growing burden of NCDs.  It also allowed these 
organizations to directly influence the development of international policy. 
Not long after the UN High Level Meeting, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo’s 
participation in the NCDRT’s activities diminished, along with their 
prominence in global NCD policy discussions.  Neither company is currently 
a member of the NCDRT, which continues to advocate on global NCD 
policy with the US Government, the WHO and UN.
126
  
B. Pan American Forum for Action on NCDs 
In 2009, the Pan American Health Organization (“PAHO”), a 
specialized agency of the Organization of American States and the Americas 
regional office of the WHO, partnered with the World Economic Forum to 
jointly establish the PAHO Partners Forum, which later became the Pan 
American Forum for Action on NCDs (“PAFNCD”), to provide a formal 
mechanism for dialogue between PAHO and private actors to address 
NCDs.
127
  PAFNCD is designed to serve as PAHO’s innovative approach to 
harness business for public good.  Similar to GHC’s NCDRT, the platform 
was designed to take an “open” and inclusive approach, promoting “multi-
stakeholder action” to implementing the PAHO Regional Strategy for the 
Prevention and Control of NCDs.
128
  Though PAHO still retains the right to 
deny membership to organizations it deems unsuitable partners, which 
includes any organization with “ties to tobacco, alcohol, weapons, land 
mines, or products deemed detrimental to public health,” the PAFNCD is 
                                                     
126  See Members, NCD ROUNDTABLE, http://www.ncdroundtable.org/about/members/ (last visited 
May 16, 2015). 
127  See Pan American Forum For Action on NCDs, PAN AM. HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.paho.org/panamericanforum/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
128  C. James Hospedales & Eva Jane-Llopis, A Multistakeholder Platform to Promote Health and 
Prevent Noncommunicable Diseases in the Region of the Americas: the Pan American Health Organization 
Partners Forum for Action, 16 J. HEALTH COMM’N 191, 198 (2011). 
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still an open, multi-sectoral forum, allowing such corporations as Pfizer, 
Medtronic and Coca-Cola to take “a lead role.”129 
PAHO’s approach to engaging with the food and beverage industry 
mirrors that of the WHO under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland and 
her Executive Director, Derek Yach.  These industries are viewed 
unequivocally as partners and full stakeholders in NCD policymaking 
without “products detrimental to public health,” despite significant research 
demonstrating the detrimental impact of SSBs and the concrete evidence that 
these industries have sought to thwart effective regulatory approaches, 
nationally and internationally.
130
  Similar to GHC’s NCDRT, the PAFNCD 
openly solicited the participation of the food and beverage industry. In a 
letter addressed to prospective members, Irene Klinger, head of the 
PAFNCD, wrote: 
 
All stakeholders have a role to play to combat the epidemic of 
NCDs in the Americas. PAFNCD brings together all actors with 
complementary roles & skills to dialogue and catalyze 
innovative ways to jointly implement the strategic priority 
initiatives of the Regional Strategy, together with the 38 PAHO 
Members States, civil society organizations, private sector 
companies and academia.
131 
 
As a welcomed partner, participant, and financer of the PAFNCD, the 
food and beverage industry has been afforded opportunities to influence 
PAHO’s policy discourse on NCDs both before and after the UN High Level 
Meeting on NCDs.  According to PAHO, the Organization’s “dialogue with 
partners,” including through the PAFNCD, was a key step in its preparatory 
process to “influence the discussion for the UN Summit [on NCDs] and 
contribute [to the] Outcome document.”
132
  In addition, the implementation 
of the PAFNCD as a proof of concept for developing cross-sector 
                                                     
129  See PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORG., RULES FOR MEMBERS ENGAGEMENT: PAN AMERICAN FORUM 
FOR ACTION ON NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES (PAFCND) (2013), http://www.paho.org/panamericanforu
m/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Rules-and-Regulations-PAFNCD-April-2013.pdf; Sanica Dalley, Latin 
America and the Caribbean: Business Booms—But Health Crisis Looms, GBC HEALTH, 
http://www.businessfightsaids.org/asset/latin-america-and-the-caribbean-business-boomsbut-health-crisis-
looms/. 
130  See Yach, supra note 125. 
131  Membership, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/panamericanforum/?p=754 (last 
visited May 16, 2015). 
132  See Challenges of the Chronic Diseases in the Americas: Opportunities for Action Beyond the UN 
High Level Meeting, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDS. (Sept. 12, 2011.), available at 
http://csis.org/files/attachments/110912_PAHO.pdf. 
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partnerships, including with food and beverage companies, was “presented 
to the UN Secretary General in September 2012 as an approach for 
developing global partnerships,” according to James Hospedales, PAHO’s 
NCD technical lead and coordinator at the time.
133
  
As such, PAHO was calling upon the food and beverage industry to 
help it refine this proof of concept (i.e. a multi-stakeholder platform to 
address NCDs), which would, in turn, be presented to the UN as an NCD 
policy alternative.  But the food and beverage industry’s influence in the 
PAFNCD stemmed beyond its role as a participant.  It was a significant 
financer and advisor for the PAFNCD and its eight strategic initiatives.
134
  A 
special report published by Reuters in 2012 highlighted a number of large 
industry donations to PAHO to support the work of the PAFNCD, including 
USD 50,000 from Coca-Cola, USD 150,000 from Nestle, and USD 150,000 
from Unilever.  Unilever and Coca-Cola were both heavily involved in 
advisory capacities for the PAFNCD and its initiatives.  Therefore, the 
question arose as to whether industry members were simply “pay[ing] for [a] 
seat at [the] health-policy table.” 135   Such contributions from industry 
directly to PAHO were also unprecedented.  The Reuters article went on to 
state, “ . . . the Pan American Health Organization, not only is relying on the 
food and beverage industry for advice on how to fight obesity. For the first 
time in its 110-year history, it has taken hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
money from the industry.”  The fact that a significant amount of PAFNCD 
funding coming from industry raises questions about PAHO’s ability to 
independently determine NCD policy and its implementation. 
As a member of the PAFNCD’s Advisory Steering Group (“ASG”), 
IFBA was appointed to the role by the Director of PAHO, and instructed to 
“advise [the PAHO] technical secretariat on the PAF-NCD from initial kick-
off to full operationalization, and to monitor its implementation and results.”  
This advice focuses on strategy, structure, resource mobilization, 
membership, and communications.  
Beyond the ASG, food and beverage industry interests reach into 
specific PAFNCD initiatives. One such example is the PAFNCD’s dietary 
salt reduction initiative, SaltSmart Consortium.  The SaltSmart Consortium 
                                                     
133  Report of the First meeting of the Pan American Forum: From Declaration to Multi-stakeholder 
Action on the NCDs, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. 15 (2012), http://www.paho.org/panamericanforum/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/PAF_First_Meeting_Final_Report.pdf  [hereinafter Pan Am Report]. 
134  The eight initiatives of the PAFNCD include: 1) dietary salt reduction; 2) cervical cancer 
prevention and control; 3) advocacy and communications; 4) healthy workplaces; 5) tobacco control; 6) 
scaling up cardiovascular disease management; 7) physical activity; and 8) wellness week.  See id. 
135  Duff Wilson & Adam Kerlin, Special Report: Food, Beverage Industry Pays for Seat at Health –
Policy Table, REUTERS, Oct. 19, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/19/us-obesity-
who-industry-idUSBRE89I0K620121019. 
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was prioritized because of the potential public health impact in the region, 
and previous successful public-private partnerships that actively engaged 
food producers to reformulate the salt content of their products.
136
  Like the 
PAFNCD Advisory Steering Group, the SaltSmart Consortium includes 
industry representatives in its advisory group.  Specifically, two food 
industry representatives, one from Unilever and the other from Kraft Foods 
(now Mondolez International) were included in the initiative’s eight-person 
advisory group.  As members of the SaltSmart Consortium’s advisory group, 
food industry interests could be brought to bear in the initiative’s strategy, 
focus and direction.
137
  Through its active participation and financial 
contributions to the SaltSmart Consortium, the food and beverage industry 
was able to influence PAHO’s NCD prevention policy implementation. 
From the PAFNCD’s inception, PAHO has contended that it would 
serve as a vehicle for policy implementation, not a platform for policy 
formulation.
138
  However, some question whether PAHO’s interest in 
collaborating with industry was unbiased, or if food and beverage companies 
bought its way to engaging with national governments from the region.  The 
PAFNCD included representatives from national governments from the 
region, affording the food and beverage industry regular access to the same 
government officials who would in turn participate in NCD policymaking 
within PAHO through the Pan American Sanitary Conference, PAHO’s 
governing body meeting.
139
  In 2012, while PAHO increased its engagement 
with industry through the PAFNCD, it guided a new regional Plan of Action 
for the Prevention and Control of Noncommunicable Diseases in the 
Americas, 2013-2019.  Adopted at the 28
th
 Pan American Sanitary 
Conference, the Plan of Action encourages governments to pursue multi-
sectoral partnerships to prevent and control NCDs, and recommends 
codification of these approaches as part of national NCD plans.
140
  This 
includes pursuing collaborations and partnerships with the private sector.  As 
part of the regional Plan of Action, PAHO plans to actively monitor country 
progress by assessing the “number of countries implementing a national 
                                                     
136 Wyness L, Butriss JL, Stanner SA. Reduction the population’s sodium intake: the UK Food 
Standards Agency’s salt reduction programme. Public Health Nutrition. 15(2): 254-261. 
137 Laura Wyness et al., Reduction the Population’s Sodium Intake: The UK Food Standards 
Agency’s Salt Reduction Programme, 15 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 254 (2012). 
138 Advisory Group, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/panamericanforum/?p=230 (last 
visited May 16, 2015). 
139
 Pan Am Report, supra note 133, at 2-4. 
140 About PAFNCDs, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG., http://www.paho.org/panamericanforum/?page_id=67 
(last visited May 16, 2015). 
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multi-sectoral plan.”141  Through these actions, PAHO has taken the concept 
of voluntary multi-sectoral action, which started with the PAFNCD, and 
created a mandate for countries to follow this approach.
142
  
Following this Reuters story exposing the influence of food and 
beverage companies within PAHO, the WHO quickly clarified its 
relationship with the private sector.  The WHO Director-General Margaret 
Chan stated that “when the WHO works with the private sector, the 
Organization takes all possible measures to ensure its work to develop policy 
and guidelines is protected from industry influence.”
143
  Such protection 
includes prohibiting funds “from enterprises that have a direct commercial 
interest in the outcome of the project toward which they would be 
contributing.”
144
  The statement continued: “the WHO Global Strategy on 
Diet, Physical Activity and Health commits WHO to hold discussions with 
the private sector, but the Organization will not take money from private 
companies active in food and beverage production for work on NCD 
prevention and control as implied by the media articles.”  PAHO, as a WHO 
Regional Office, would be in violation of the WHO policy by accepting 
funds from the food and beverage industry to support NCD prevention and 
control initiatives.  However, PAHO is unique among the WHO regional 
offices in that it wears two organizational hats, the WHO Regional Office for 
the Americas (“AMRO”) and the specialized health agency of the 
Organization of the American States (“PAHO”).  Chan points out, “In some 
areas the two entities may have variations in policy,”
145
 thereby attempting 
to disassociate the WHO from PAHO’s decision to accept food and beverage 
industry funding. 
PAHO’s acceptance of food and beverage industry funding set off a 
number of negative reactions within the global public health community, 
particularly among those in the nutrition community. Public health advocates 
started petitions to PAHO.
146
  For example, the International Lactation 
Consultant Association (“ILCA”) issued a statement and filed a formal 
                                                     
141  Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of NonCommunicable Diseases in the Americas 
2013-2019, PAN AM. HEALTH ORG. (2014), http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&ta-
sk=doc_view&Itemid= 270&gid=21345&lang=en. 
142  Id. at 10. 
143 Margaret Chan, WHO Sets the Record Straight on Work with the Food and Beverage Industry, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2012/nutrition_2
0121119/en/. 
144 See id. 
145  See id. 
146  See Urge the World Health Organization to Cut Ties with Nestle: Our Mothers and Babies are 
Worth It, THE PETITION SITE, http://www.thepetitionsite.com/569/157/115/urge-the-world-health-
organization-to-cut-ties-with-nestle-our-mothers-and-babies-are-worth-it/ (last visited May 16, 2015). 
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complaint with PAHO citing PAHO’s acceptance of funding from Nestle, 
whom ILCA argued, “market[s] products detrimental to health” and is not 
“meeting their obligations under the International Code [of Marketing of 
Breast-milk Substitutes].”
147
  The World Public Health Nutrition Association 
also sent an open letter to PAHO in February 2013, following the election of 
PAHO new director Dr. Carissa Etienne, stating, “the fact that PAHO 
received money from The Coca-Cola Company and other food and beverage 
corporations has damaged its reputation as the leading UN organization 
concerned with nutrition and public health in our Hemisphere.”  The letter, 
signed by leading public health and nutrition experts including Marion 
Nestle, Barry Popkin, and Walter Willett, called on Dr. Etienne to 
“reconsider recent steps that have moved PAHO away from the path of 
promoting better nutrition and health” by engaging with “multinational 
corporations whose interests are in conflict with those of public health.”
148 
Responding to the pressure from the public health community, PAHO 
took several steps which altered the nature of the organization’s engagement 
with the food and beverage industry.  First, Dr. Carissa Ettiene, assumed the 
position at a time when civil society was discontent with the Organization 
and calling for significant changes with its relationships with food and 
beverage companies.  Second, PAHO subsequently shifted fiduciary control 
of the PAFNCD’s initiatives to the PAHO Foundation—formerly the Pan 
American Health and Education Foundation—which is a 501(c)(3) 
charitable arm of PAHO.
149
  Third, the PAFNCD currently assumes a much 
less prominent role in PAHO’s NCD programming, in part because key staff 
that championed and implemented the initiative are no longer with PAHO.  
These staff include the PAFNCD’s director, PAHO’s NCD coordinator, who 
was also the visionary behind the PAFNCD, and PAHO’s deputy director 
who led partnerships and external relations for the organization.  The 
PAFNCD website is still active; however its last news release was from June 
14, 2013.
150 
                                                     
147  Elizabeth Brooks, Statement from the ILCA Board on PAHO and WHO Acceptance of Industry 
Fund, 29 J. HUM. LACTATION 289, 289-90 (2013). 
148  Open Letter to New UN Agency Chief: No More Deals with Nestle Please, WORLD PUB. HEALTH 
NUTRITION ASSOC. (March 2013), http://www.wphna.org/htdocs/2013_mar_hp1_paho.htm. 
149  About PAHO Foundation, PAHO FOUNDATION, http://www.pahofoundation.org/en/aboutus.html 
(last visited May 16, 2015). 
150  SaltSmart Consortium Endorses Plan to Halve Dietary Salt Consumption in the Americas by 
2020, PAHO/WHO (June 14, 2013), http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=8801%3Asaltsmart-consortium-endorses-plan-to-halve-dietary-consumption-in-the-americas-by-
2020-&catid=740%3Anews-press-releases&Itemid=1926&lang=en. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
The NCDRT and PAFNCD both provide valuable lessons that 
governments, international organizations and other stakeholders to consider 
when formulating NCD policies and partnerships. Engagement with industry 
is inevitable and in fact is already occurring.  Momentum towards this 
approach has been building for a number of years.
151
  States have the 
sovereign right to work with the private sector when developing global 
health strategies, including the right to involve industry representatives on 
state delegations to international meetings.  Many contend that private sector 
participation allows for rational decision-making.  Private businesses are 
regulated entities, and therefore, have a right to be heard and participate. 
Informed industry opinions can, in some cases, help shape cogent policy. 
However, given the increased involvement of the private sector in 
NCD policy-making, public health organizations should remain wary of 
companies’ conflicting interests.  In addition to the cases discussed 
previously, the UN Global Compact, NCDnet, a collaborate arrangement 
between UN agencies and non-state actors, and the Moscow Global Forum, 
held in April 2011 prior to the UN High Level Meeting are all examples of 
the UN system directly engaging with industry around NCDs.  Some have 
argued this engagement led to favorable outcomes for industry in the UN 
High Level Meeting’s Political Declaration.
152
  Food companies may play a 
role in addressing NCDs, and in some cases, business interests may align 
with public health.  However, this engagement shouldn’t be accidental or 
assumed.  Business interests may align with public health in some instances, 
but the fundamental motivations and interests of the private sector and 
public health differ.  A Corporations’ primary duty is to maximize profit for 
shareholders, not the health of consumers.
153
  These profit-maximization 
motivations will always dominate the actions of the private sector.  As such, 
public health organizations should remain vigilant when interacting with 
industry, particularly with companies whose products are known to 
contribute to negative health outcomes, such as SSBs. 
Therefore, the most important question is how to structure this 
engagement to ensure it advances public health in a transparent, accountable 
manner.  Without the necessary controls, industry’s involvement in 
international organizations and policy dialogue at the WHO and the UN can 
                                                     
151  See Kent Buse  & Amalia Waxman, Public-Private Health Partnerships: A Strategy for WHO, 79 
BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 748 (2001). 
152  See David Stuckler et al., Commentary: UN High Level Meeting on Non-communicable Diseases: 
An Opportunity for Whom?, 343 BMJ 1 (2011). 
153  See Gerard Hastings, Why corporate Power is a Public Health Priority, 345 BMJ 1 (2012). 
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inhibit progress.  When PPPs involve the food and beverage industry, their 
efficacy is debatable.  
As a result of the limited outcome evidence to support PPPs with food 
and beverage companies, the cases of the NCDRT and PAFNCD are 
concerning for the integrity of future global health and NCD policy-making 
and partnerships.  The case studies discussed above highlight three themes 
relating to how SSB companies engage on global NCDs: A) resource 
constraints and public-private partnerships, B) policy incoherence, and C) 
insufficient accountability.  Increasing fiscal constraints on public sector 
funding has led to international development and global health communities 
to pursuing alternative financing mechanisms, presenting an opportunity for 
greater industry involvement.  This increased willingness of governments, 
international organizations, and NGOs to pursue collaborations with industry 
deviates, at times, from existing policies or approaches, leading to policy 
incoherence.  Further, as PPPs have emerged to fill resource and 
programmatic voids within global health, there are insufficient controls to 
require companies to transparently disclose interests, prevent conflicts of 
interest, and ensure sufficient accountability.  Though specific to NCDs, 
these lessons can help inform future partnership development within the 
broader global health and international development communities.  In 
particular, strong consideration should be taken as stakeholders continue to 
debate the evolving international development architecture and the post-
2015 agenda. 
 
A.  Resource Constraints and the Rise of Public–Private Partnerships 
 
Ongoing resource constraints in international development and global 
health have forced governments to increasingly pursue alternative financing 
and program implementation arrangements through PPPs.
154
  This resource 
gap is most apparent in global NCD financing.  A substantial resource gap 
exists between the burden of disease from NCDs and their commensurate 
resources.
155
  This gap exists between donors and middle- and low-income 
country national budgets.
156
  Less than 5 percent of official development 
assistance for health is for global NCDs.
157
  In the case of the NCD 
                                                     
154  INST. FOR HEALTH METRICS AND EVALUATION, TASK FORCE REPORT: FINANCING GLOBAL 
HEALTH 2013: TRANSITION IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY (2014). 
155  Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. et al., The Emerging Global Health Crisis: Noncommunicable Diseases in 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE (2014). 
156  W.K. Bosu, A Comprehensive Review of the Policy and Programmatic Response to Chronic Non-
communicable Disease in Ghana, 46 GHANA MED. J. 69 (2012). 
157  See Nugent & Feigl, supra note 76. 
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Roundtable and PAFNCD, both were unfunded mandates at their inception.  
GHC’s membership overwhelmingly favored (and urged) the organization’s 
involvement and leadership of NCDs but it lacked any dedicated resources 
for the program area.  The PAFNCD has similarly struggled to acquire 
dedicated resources internally, which likely influenced PAHO’s decision to 
seek outside funding from food and beverage companies.  
As evaluations of global PPPs have shown, they are effective in 
mobilizing resources, a potential benefit in both cases of the NCDRT and 
PAFNCD.  At the time GHC launched the NCDRT, the organization relied 
on two primary funding streams: membership dues and a large grant from 
the Gates Foundation.  Neither proved sustainable and GHC announced it 
would close operations the following year.
158
  The organization faced a 
challenging financial situation when embarking upon its NCD work, and the 
appeal of funding from the private sector provided a strong incentive to 
include them in a significant way.  
Beyond PAHO, the WHO has faced chronic resource constraints over 
the past several decades, and its reliance on extra-budgetary contributions 
has skewed its priorities.  Roughly 80 percent of the WHO’s funding comes 
from extra-budgetary funds from States and private sources which 
significantly influence the WHO’s capacity to focus on particular health 
issues.  For example, the majority of the WHO’s extra-budgetary 
contributions are earmarked for infectious disease programs, despite NCDs 
accounting for more than 60 percent of all deaths worldwide and injuries 
accounting for some 17 percent of global disease burden.
159
  Previous 
research on the topic has found that over 90 percent of the WHO’s extra-
budgetary funds were earmarked for diseases that accounted for less than 10 
percent of global mortality.
160 
At the country level, national governments in some low- and middle-
income countries have identified financial constraints as one of the principle 
reasons for limited progress on NCD prevention and control.
161
  A common 
justification for PPPs is to overcome these resource constraints.
162
  Indeed, 
                                                     
158  Global Health Council to Close Operations, BLOG 4 GLOBAL HEALTH (Apr. 20, 2012), 
https://blog4globalhealth.wordpress.com/2012/04/20/global-health-council-to-close-operations/. 
159  Devi Sridhar & Lawrence O. Gostin, Reforming the World Health Organization. 35 J. AM. MED. 
ASSOC. 1585, 1586 (2011). 
160  Sonia Shah, How Private Companies Are Transforming the Global Public Health Agenda, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136654/sonia-shah/how-
private-companies-are-transforming-the-global-public-health. 
161  See JEFFREY L STURCHIO & AKASH GOEL, CTR. STRATEGIC AND INT’L. STUDS. THE PRIVATE-
SECTOR ROLE IN PUBLIC HEALTH: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE IN HEALTH (2012), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/120131_Sturchio_PrivateSectorRole_Web.pdf. 
162  See id. 
JUNE 2015 TAKE ME TO YOUR LITER 665 
 
evaluations of PPPs typically focus on resource-sharing objectives, and 
generally show positive results from a resource mobilization perspective.
163
  
The goal of many PPPs is to mobilize resources that enable the execution of 
public programs.  However, effectiveness measures are often overlooked or 
de-emphasized, in part due to ambiguous objectives.  Such objectives often 
point to “increased cooperation” or “increased collaboration among 
stakeholders” as desired outcomes.  These process-oriented, short-term aims 
often substitute for outcome-focused, long-term objectives, which represent 
a better measure of the PPP’s effectiveness. 
B. Policy Incoherence 
This new era of collaboration and partnerships with industry deviates 
from previously-held positions that viewed industry engagement more 
critically.  This shift results in policy incoherence between global 
governance and NCD policy priorities.  Prior research in tobacco control 
found that policy incoherence occurs when there are inconsistencies between 
different policies, thus resulting in their mutual impairment.
164
  In the case of 
tobacco, the WHO facilitated the FCTC to regulate certain transnational 
corporations seen as fundamentally detrimental to health.  But at the same 
time, the WHO increased its support for and involvement in collaborations 
and partnerships with the private sector.  Widespread participation, including 
engagement with the food, beverage, and alcohol industries, became a tenant 
of good governance with the WHO and other international organizations.  
With this shift away from industry skepticism, regulatory approaches 
are being replaced with industry self-regulation and increased opportunities 
for “multi-stakeholder” engagement.  In spite of widespread recognition of 
the FCTC’s success as a global governance model tool, many see it as 
unique to tobacco with little or no useful application for other NCD risk 
factors, such as unhealthy eating and excessive alcohol consumption.  
Indeed, many global health thought-leaders have called for the active 
inclusion of “the private sector, particularly the food and beverage 
industries,” stating it is “extremely important to finding durable solutions” 
related to NCD prevention.
165
  This view persists despite calls from many 
public health groups for stronger regulation of the food, beverage, and 
alcohol industries.  Some view the FCTC as a model legal instrument that 
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could be applied to unhealthy food and beverage product, such as through a 
Framework Convention on Obesity.  Though this type of binding treaty is 
highly unlikely, governments could consider alternative regulatory 
approaches, such as an International Code of Practice on the Marketing of 
SSBs to Children.  Such a measure may help address one area of coercive 
tactics employed by the food and beverage industry that persists despite self-
regulation.
166 
Further, the WHO continues to urge national governments to pursue 
partnerships with the private sector to mobilize resources, strengthen 
capacity, and enhance collaboration to address NCDs.
167
  At the same, the 
WHO stresses the need for “robust governance mechanisms to safeguard 
public health from conflicts of interest.”
 168
  Indeed, the WHO Director-
General Margaret Chan has stated that food and beverage companies 
“protect themselves by using the same tactics” as Big Tobacco.
169
  Chan has 
also suggested that food and beverage companies are the “opposition,” and 
that “when industry is involved in policy-making, rest assured that the most 
effective control measures will be downplayed or left out entirely.”
170 
The WHO has also strengthened its recommendations on sugar intake, 
despite pushback from industry. On March 4, 2015, the WHO released new 
sugar intake guidelines for adults and children, advising that it be reduced to 
less than 10 percent of total energy intake.  The guidelines also conditionally 
recommend individuals to reduce intake to less than 5 percent of total energy 
intake.
171
 In response, the International Council of Beverage Associations, 
which includes Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, released a statement opposing the 
measure, suggesting that WHO’s recommendation “does not reflect 
scientific agreement on the totality of evidence.”
172
  
While the WHO’s new guidelines on sugar intake suggest a more 
aggressive approach to combating the pervasiveness of sugar in high-income 
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and increasingly middle- and low-income countries, its recommendations on 
how to achieve these changes (e.g., through PPPs) is questionable. Previous 
assertions by Chan on the adversarial nature of food and beverage 
companies seem contrary to the WHO’s activities of engaging with and 
promoting partnerships with these industries.  Such partnership approaches 
are also contrary to existing research on PPPs generally, and those 
specifically involving the food and beverage industry.  
C. Insufficient Accountability 
As the global health landscape becomes increasingly complex and 
resources continue to flow into PPPs, evaluation and accountability will be 
critical.  Although PPPs are a popular strategy to address global health 
challenges, they often lack sufficient evaluation protocols to assess their 
effectiveness.
173
  In their review of independent evaluations of existing 
global health PPPs, Buse and Tanaka found that there is a “relatively small 
number of independent GHP [global health partnership] evaluations publicly 
available, however, reflects the generally inadequate commitment of global 
health programmes, including partnerships, to evaluation.”
174
  A separate 
review of PPPs in developing countries commissioned by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands details the shortcomings of existing PPP 
evaluations, which often lack an appropriate reference point for comparison 
prior to the PPP and are unclear whether positive effects directly result from 
the PPP or some other factor.
175
  Some contend that PPPs “are basically 
public relations and market expansion gambits for the private sector.”
176 
The limited commitment to evaluations of PPPs in global health 
presents a key question of accountability, especially when these partnerships 
include contentious stakeholders, such as the food and beverage industry.  
Currently, few accountability mechanisms exist to assess the nature of the 
food and beverage industry’s interaction with the public sector and civil 
society in current PPPs; concrete mechanisms for monitoring and review 
should be an essential component of future partnerships.  Both the NCDRT 
and PAFNCD implemented few accountability measures, and the PAHO 
altered its means for engaging with the food and beverage industry only after 
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significant negative media exposure.  Many national governments lack an 
independent accountability mechanism to assess collaborations and 
partnerships with industry.  Meanwhile, private resources have become a 
significant funding stream in global health, yet the extent of these resources 
and the relationships between actors are not well understood.
177
  
Transparency and accountability have also been major concerns at the WHO, 
in part due to the WHO not having a third-party review process for the 
partnerships it enters.  In short, the WHO lacks an independent means of 
protecting against conflicts of interest.  
In the area of PPPs to address NCDs, some have called for the 
establishment or improvement of monitoring systems of private sector 
policies and practices, especially those related to the food and beverage 
industry.  Such systems must be independent and empowered with 
enforcement authority and capabilities, as The Lancet NCD Action Group 
has proposed.
178
  In a 2015 Lancet article, Swinburn and colleagues outlined 
an accountability framework to promote healthy food environments, which 
also included enforcement mechanisms for both governments and the private 
sector, such as legal, quasi-regulatory, market-based, and other strategies.179  
Similarly, the International Network for Food and Obesity/NCD Research, 
Monitoring and Action Support (“INFORMAS”) has created a monitoring 
approach of private sector policies and practices that influence food 
environments.
180
  Although many of the monitoring measures of food and 
beverage industry policies and practices in global NCD prevention and 
control are still being developed, they emphasize the need for greater 
transparency and independent monitoring. 
Many public health experts believe it is not possible to construct 
effective public health partnerships with food and beverage companies.  A 
Lancet-sponsored group of independent experts in a 2013 review of tobacco, 
alcohol, and ultra-processed food and drink industries concluded that 
“despite the common reliance on industry self-regulation and public-private 
partnerships to improve public health, there is no evidence to support their 
effectiveness or safety.”
181
  The article unequivocally stated that “unhealthy 
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commodity industries should have no role in the formation of national or 
international policy for non-communicable disease policy.”  Others have 
gone further to suggest governments, international organizations, and other 
stakeholders “reject partnership with food and alcohol industries as 
inappropriate and voluntary regulation as inadequate given the global 
challenge of obesity and alcohol related harms.”
182 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 
This discussion has important implications for the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals that aim to achieve “improved nutrition”
183
 and “ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.”184  Realizing these 
goals requires governments, the public health community, civil society, and 
other stakeholders carefully scrutinize and define terms of engagement with 
the food and beverage industry to ensure public health remains the highest 
priority.  The global health community must ask questions of the private 
sector and explicitly define its role; its full participation and cooperation in 
global health policy decision-making should not be assumed.  Food and 
beverage companies may very well be able to play a role, but governments 
should not conflate setting public health objectives through policy with 
strategies to achieve them.
185
  
Such questions are not currently at the forefront of policy discourse on 
global NCDs.  Other important questions have risen to the top of the 
agenda,
186
 while a largely undefined “multi-stakeholder” or “multi-sectoral” 
approach remains a prevailing assumption, such as in proposed SDG 17, 
which calls for “multi-stakeholder partnerships . . . to support the 
achievement of sustainable development goals” and “encourage[s] . . . 
public-private . . . partnerships.”187   As researchers have found in other 
sectors, such as agriculture, PPPs may serve a valuable purpose, but they 
“are not automatically the right choice to solve every challenge in 
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agriculture.”
188
  After all, PPPs remain a relatively new form of development 
cooperation.  As Peter Drucker, an influential philosopher of the modern 
business corporation, said, “erroneous assumptions can be disastrous.”  A 
solution is only as effective as its underlying assumptions.  When 
assumptions are faulty, solution strategies are misguided and ultimately fail.   
As a 2012 PLoS Medicine editorial argued, “the food industry is ripe 
for scrutiny.”
189
 Its attempts to gain legitimacy within global health resemble 
many of the same tactics previously used by the tobacco industry.  Food and 
beverage companies are actively pursuing opportunities to influence the 
policy debate and policy-making on global NCDs, as the NCDRT and 
PAFNCD cases demonstrate.  Thus, as the WHO continues to pursue and 
promote an inclusive, multi-sectoral approach to addressing NCDs, it should 
consider the food and beverage industry’s history as an effective partner.  
Ultimately, is the industry motivated to protect public health, or is their 
involvement in global NCDs a strategic decision based on business 
interests? As Beaglehole and colleagues state, “market forces contribute to 
the rise of NCDs . . . from the successful marketing of unhealthy products; 
this outcome provides strong justification for government intervention 
through regulatory and legislative responses.”
190 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
PPPs have become an important strategy to address complex global 
health challenges.  As the global burden of NCDs and obesity expands, 
governments, international organizations, and civil society will continue to 
explore opportunities to collaborate with the private sector, including in 
pursuit of achieving the forthcoming SDGs.  In many cases, the private 
sector, including the food and beverage industry, has a “seat at the table.”  
Like tobacco companies, however, food and beverage companies are 
employing similar tactics as tobacco companies to sway public sentiment 
and influence the outcome of policy debates.  While the debate continues 
regarding the specific mechanisms required to advance global NCD policy, 
this article offers two cautionary case studies supporting the need for 
sufficient monitoring and accountability with whatever mechanism is 
pursued.  As with tobacco companies, some food and beverage companies 
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manufacture products that are detrimental to health, such as SSBs.  
Consumption of these unhealthy products is increasing in many low- and 
middle-income countries and sometimes replacing native foods.  The 
constructive participation of the companies that produce these products 
should not be assumed.  
